Crude Oil: The Best Commodity Play for 2012

 

Crude oil may not only be the best commodity play for 2012, it could prove to be the best commodity play of the next three to four years, soundly beating both gold and silver. I’m not talking about oil producers, refiners or drillers…or any individual stock — but the real thing: crude oil itself.

 

Don’t get us wrong, we still like gold and silver and will probably recommend jumping back into silver shortly. But you can’t pour gold into a farm tractor and use it to grow more food. You can’t pump silver into a 747 and use it to transport cargo. You can’t use gold or silver to make overall production more efficient and generate a higher standard of living. In fact, you can’t do any of these things without crude oil. This is why crude is and will continue to be the world’s most essential commodity.

5 Reasons to Buy Crude Oil Now

1) Oil supplies have peaked — oil supply lags discovery by approximately 40 years. New oil discoveries peaked in 1965. Not surprisingly, production has basically flat-lined since 2005. Despite all the press given to new deep water discoveries and North American shale supplies, new production is not keeping up with the depletion of old wells.

 

2) Producing nations are consuming more of their own output and exporting less. Saudi Arabia, Iran, Norway and Venezuela are exporting far less oil than they did in 2006.

3) Global population is growing rapidly and more people are growing accustomed to better, more energy-dependent lifestyles.

4) Crude oil is decoupling from the dollar. For most of 2011, crude oil was a “risk on”, short dollar play. No longer. Crude is rallying in both strong and weak dollar environments. This is bullish.

5) The odds of a preemptive strike against Iran (the 3rd largest oil producer) are the highest they’ve been in years. 33% of global tanker traffic passes through the Strait of Hormuz which Iran has threatened to close in retaliation for global trade sanctions. Expect it to make good on those threats if bombs start falling on its nuclear facilities.

Therefore, we believe crude has a better chance of doubling from its current $100 per barrel level than gold has doubling from its current levels of $1,575 per ounce. It’s not that we hate gold. We don’t. Some of the same conditions that favor crude will also favor the shiny stuff. But for “bang for the buck,” we feel crude oil is the best opportunity on the board right now.

What is the best way to play it? Energy stocks tend to under perform actual energy products during bullish price spikes. Producer/processor Exxon rose 23.3% and refiner Valero rose 54.5% during crude’s last run-up to $147 per barrel in 2008. Crude oil itself nearly tripled. Why trade crude oil producers, refiners and drillers when we can just trade crude oil itself?

I recommend using NYMEX crude oil options. NYMEX crude oil options are the most liquid (no pun intended) oil option market in the world — making buying and selling them about as easy as buying and selling most stocks. NYMEX crude options are a DIRECT PLAY on the price of the oil itself. NYMEX crude oil options also provide big leverage with fixed risk. That means we can devote a small amount of capital to our oil investment while keeping the bulk of our hard-earned dollars in safe, interest-bearing instruments.

There are many different ways to structure a bullish trade on crude oil. But I recommend the kinds of structures that provide plenty of time for the trade to succeed. Even though I expect crude to make a very strong move to the upside in 2012, I could certainly be wrong about that. So my favorite way to bet on crude oil right now is to utilize a “bull call spread” that does not expire until 2015.

This professional trading strategy may sound complicated, but it is really quite simple. And more importantly, is one of the safest options strategies that professional investors use. The bull call spread I like right now combines two different options. The first gives the investor the right to own 1,000 barrels of crude oil at $125 per barrel. The second option creates obligation to sell 1,000 barrels of crude oil at $150 per barrel.

So that means the investor has the right to buy crude oil at $125, but must also sell that crude oil at $150. Therefore, the investor can make the $25 per barrel difference, but no more. $25 times the 1,000 barrel contract size equals $25,000. Subtract the $3,000 cost of the trade to get a net potential of $22,000 — that’s a 7-to-1 maximum upside.

If the trade does not work out as hoped, the investor’s maximum possible loss would be the initial $3,000 cost of the trade. That’s the kind of risk/reward opportunity I like. Oil is a buy…maybe the very best buy in the entire commodity sector.

By Steve Belmont for The Daily Reckoning

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Import Quotas

Import Quotas

Import Quotas are a “non-tariff trade barrier”
used to limit imports of particular products.

By limiting imports these quotas
can be used to stabilize the US price above the world price for the protected
products.

US suppliers benefit from the higher prices. Supporters of import
quota policies note that the policy gives protection to domestic industry with
no cost to the American taxpayer.

Those who receive the import quotas get the right to buy a product at the lower world price and sell the product in the US for a higher price,so the quotas are valuable rights allocated by the US government to foreign governments it wishes to support. The costs of an import quota program are born largely by consumers of the product subject to import quotas.

US Sugar
Import Quota Program
.
Note the chart below of world US prices for raw sugar (not yet refined).
The US inititated the import quota system for sugar in the early 1980s.
Since then the world price of sugar has ranged from less than 5 cents to 13 cents per pound.
Recently the world price has been below 10 cents.
Within the US the price has mostly ranged bewtween 20 and 24 cents.

Products Under US Import Quotas

  • Sugar and products with more than 65% sugar content
  • Tobaccco
  • Peanuts and peanut butter
  • Many specific dairy products (e.g. powdered milk, baby formula)
  • Cotton
  • Beef
  • Animal feed
  • Anchovies
  • Wire rod
  • Ethyl alcohol
  • Olives
  • Mandarin oranges
  • Tuna
  • Brooms and others. For more information see the US Customs Department: www.customs.gov

 

Sugar Cane

 

Sugar Beets

 

The Rule of One Price: Economists argue that markets, if allowed to function freely, will generate one price for traded products. What they have in mind is that if, for example, the price of sugar was higher in the US than in Mexico, then someone could make a profit through arbitrage (buying low and selling high). If traders bought sugar in Mexico to sell in the US, then the extra demand in Mexico would raise the price of sugar in Mexico, and the extra sugar supplied by traders to the US would operate to lower the price of sugar in the US, and this would continue until the price of sugar was the same on each side of the border. Of course, even if markets were free to operate like this, prices differences which reflect transport, storage, and risk costs will persist. The price data charted below show that when world prices are very high (mid 1970s and around 1980) the rule of one price seems to hold for sugar. Otherwise, US sugar policy has operated to prevent the US price of sugar from falling to world price levels.    Quotas on US Sugar Imports: Under the sugar import quota system (which started in 1983?) imports of raw sugar are limited to about 3 billion pounds (about 15% of US consumption). Since 1995 the world price of sugar has shown a downward trend. Normally, if the world price falls relative to the US price, we would expect imports to increase. However, under the quota system, the quotas allocated to sugar importers decreased during this time. From the data, it seems as if imports are restricted to a level which keeps the US price above 20 cents per pound. 

Using the Trade Model for Import Quotas: We can construct our model of the US sugar market to fit data which appoximate current conditions in the market:US Price: 20 cents per poundWorld Price: 10 cents per pound

US Production: 17 billion pounds

US Imports: 3 billion pounds

US Consumption 20 billion pounds

US Average cost of production: 12 cents per pound

Step One: We know that when the price in the US is 20 cents per pound US producers supply about 17 billion pounds, so the US supply curve goes through the point P=.20 and Q=17. Secondly, production costs per pound of sugar are about 12 cents. So we draw our US supply curve so that if price fell to 10 cents, the US quantity supplied would be zero. This is done in the diagram to the right.      Step Two The sugar import quota system has operated to limit US imports of sugar to 3 billion pounds. So the total supply of sugar in the US market is the Supply(US) plus the 3 that can be imported. This is shown as “Supply(US) + 3” in the diagram to the right..     Step Three: We know that when the price in the US is 20 cents per pound US consumers buy about 20 billion pounds, so the US demand curve goes through the point P=.20 and Q=20. This is done in the diagram to the right.   Step Four: Putting the supply and demand together we can see how the import quota is set at 3 so that 20 cents is the market equilibrium price in the US .     Calculating the magnitude of the efficiency loss caused by the sugar import program:Economists argue that trade is benficial to both buyers and sellers. From this it follows that restricitions on trade, like the sugar import program, will cause some loss in efficiency. Now it may be that, as a country, we are willing to incur some efficiency loss in order to pursue some other objective like preserving agricultural lifestyles. Many developed countries restrict trade in agricultural products to protect their domestic farmers. The Japanese restrict rice imports and the Norwegians restrict dairy product imports. The US restricts sugar imports. One job for economists is to calculate the costs of such programs so that more informed decisions can be made about whether it is too costly to have programs like the sugar import quota program. If the cost to the US is only $1 million per year, maybe the program is a cheap way to protect farmers and maintain a vibrant ag community. But if the cost is $100 billion, maybe not. These calculations are provided here.

Questions1. Suppose that due to increases in income, the demand for sugar in the US increased {shift to the right of Demand(US)};a. What is the effect on the price in the US?

b. What is the effect on the quantity supplied by US producers?

c. What is the effect on the quantity of sugar imported?

2. Suppose that the world price of sugar fell from 10 cents per pound to 5 cents per pound. What are the effects on the US sugar market?

3. High fructose corn syrup (HFCS) is a sweetener made from corn. HFCS is a close substitute for sugar. About 50% of food sweeteners come from HFCS in the US. Noting the the sugar import quota raise the price of sugar in the US, analyze the effect of this program on (a) the market for HFCS, and (b) the price of corn.Would corn farmers support the sugar import quota system?

4. Suppose that pressure from the World Trade Organization (WTO) force the US to stop using the sugar import quota system and instead have free trade in sugar. Analyze the effects on the US market if the US were to have free trade in sugar.

5. Refer to Bastiat’s petition for the candlemakers, but rewrite it using US and foreign produced sugar as the example.

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Sugar Quota

Using Consumer and Producer Surplus to Calculate the Cost of the Sugar Import Quota System

From our description of the US sugar market, we learned that the sugar import quota system operated to raise the price of sugar in the US to be about two times higher than the world price. US sugar producers gain from this program while US consumers of sugar (i.e.Coca Cola, Hersheys) are made worse off by the program. But additionally, the restriction on trade introduces some inefficiency to the market. Economists argue that trade is benficial to both buyers and sellers. From this it follows that restricitions on trade, like the sugar import program, will cause some loss in efficiency. Now it may be that, as a country, we are willing to incur some efficiency loss in order to pursue some other objective like preserving agricultural lifestyles. Many developed countries restrict trade in agricultural products to protect their domestic farmers. The Japanese restrict rice imports and the Norwegians restrict dairy product imports. The US restricts sugar imports. One job for economists is to calculate the costs of such programs so that more informed decisions can be made about whether it is too costly to have programs like the sugar import quota program. If the cost to the US is only $1 million per year, maybe the program is a cheap way to protect farmers and maintain a vibrant ag community. But if the cost is $100 billion, maybe not.

From our previous description of the US Sugar Import Quota and the US sugar market we gleaned these (appoximate) facts:US Price: 20 cents per poundWorld Price: 10 cents per pound

US Production: 17 billion pounds

US Imports: 3 billion pounds

US Consumption 20 billion pounds

US Average cost of production: 12 cents per pound

The diagram to the right is drawn to be consistent with these “facts”.

 If there were free trade in sugar: First we look at what the US market would look like if there were free trade for sugar. Given our facts, if there was free trade, the price of sugar would fall to about $ .10 per pound in the US. Given the US supply curve, if the price was $ .10 per pound the quantity supplied by US sugar beet and sugar cane growers would be ZERO…that is, the US would import all of its sugar, and consumers would expand consumption from 20 to 25 billion pounds per year. The graph to the right shows what the US market would look like if we allowed sugar to be freely imported. The price in the US would fall to $ .10, the quantity demanded would increase to 25 (probably a shift from HFCS to sugar by some food processors), quantity supplied by US producers would fall to zero, and imports would be 25. With free trade and a price of $ .10 per pound consumer surplus would be equal to the area shaded green in the diagram to the right.  

Costs of the Sugar Import Quota System: As noted above the sugar import quota system causes the price in the US to be $ .20 per pound instead of the world price of $ .10 per pound. This cost is borne by sugar consumers and is quantified as a loss in consumer surplus. We can calculate the magnitude of the loss in consumer surplus geometrically as the area of the trapzoidal area shaded light green in the diagram to the right. Benefits of the sugar import program. There are two groups of benificiaries of this program. First is the US sugar producers. If there were free trade in sugar with a price of $ .10, the quantity supplied would have been zero, but with the program, the price of sugar is $ .20, US producers supply 17 billion pounds of sugar, and earn a producer surplus shown in the diagram to the right. The magnitude of the producer surplus is calculated as the area of the shaded producer surplus triangle which is $ .10 tall, and 17 billion wide and thus the producer surplus is equal to ($ .10)(17billion)(1/2)=$.85billion.The second beneficiary of the program are those that are allocated import quotas. These importers get the chance to buy sugar at the world price and then sell it in the US. They earn a profit of ($ .20 – $ .10)= ten cents per pound and get to import 3 billion pounds and so earn a total profit of $ .3 billion per year. This is shown as the area of the shaded rectangle in the diagram to the right. Cost minus Benefits = Efficiciency Loss: Above we noted that the cost of the sugar import quota was the loss in consumer surplus. Then we noted some of the lost consumer surplus was captured as a benefit for US sugar producers (shown as the producer surplus) and a benefit for owners of the import quotas (shown as “Profit for Quota Owners”). But the costs of the program are greater than the benefits and the magnitude of the loss in efficiency is calculated as the size of the two shaded triangles shown in the diagram to the right.The magnitude of the two shaded deadweight loss triangles represent that portion of the loss in consumer surplus not showing up as benefits for either US sugar producers or sugar importers. They are triangles, and we know the dimensions of the triangles, and so we can calculate their size. This is done in the diagram to the right. The results of the sugar import program can be summarized as:  

Loss in Consumer SurplusGain in Producer SurplusProfits for Importers

Deadweight Loss

$2.25 billion$ .85 billion$ .30 billion

$1.10 billion

 

Sugar Import Quota and US EmploymentAudio file from NPR on closure of Lifesavers factory in MichiganPolitics of Sugar Import Quota

Audio file from NPR on political backing for Sugar Import Quota

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